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THE USE OF TRADE SANCTIONS AS AN
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM FOR BASIC HUMAN




In the spring of 1994, a debate raged in the United States concerning
the trade status of China in relation to its policy on human rights.' On
one side, economists contended that to deny China Most Favored Nation
trading status would ultimately hurt the United States as much as China,
and that the emphasis on human rights cost both countries economic op-
portunities.2 On the opposite side of the debate, human rights activists
and many politicians argued that to continue to permit China, a nation
infamous for its violations of human rights, to retain Most Favored
Nation trading status would be "a political, diplomatic and moral error
of almost equal proportions."3 The United States demanded that China
improve its human rights policy in order to retain its trade status." Chi-
na reacted with the assertion that the United States was interfering with
* B.A., Univ. of Utah; J.D., Gonzaga Univ. School of Lavr, LL.M.,
Georgetown Law Center. The author wishes to thank Richard Stirling and Professor
Don Wallace for their invaluable suggestions and feedback, as well as the Ford Foun-
dation for its generous grant supporting this research.
1. See Robert S. Greenburger, Cacophony of Voices Drowns Out Message From
U.S. to China, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22, 1994, at A8 (chronicling the Clinton
administration's struggle in front of the media over the use of trade sanctions against
China to encourage an improvement in China's domestic human rights policy).
2. Id.
3. See Alan Murray, Chinese-Trade Dilemma: New Thinking Needed, WALL ST.
J., Mar. 14, 1994, at Al (recognizing the integral role of human rights in the devel-
opment of foreign policy and suggesting that one alternative for the United States is
to use its influence with the World Bank to restrict China's access to loans).
4. Greenburger, supra note 1, at Al.
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Chinese domestic policies and inflicting a political ideology that had no
place in China's agenda.5 Ultimately, the forces of trade and economics
prevailed and the United States permitted China to retain its Most Fa-
vored Nation trading status.' Human rights, the issue which sparked the
initial furor, appears to have become an almost forgotten footnote.
The aforementioned situation between China and the United States is
an illustration of the general ineffectiveness of the current use of trade
by the United States as a mechanism for the enforcement of human
rights, specifically for the encouragement of democracy. Increasingly,
political ideology has become intimately tied to human rights. Haiti is
an additional illustration of this situation, as was the former Soviet
Union. One commentator has suggested that the United States use the
same Helsinki Accords "basket" approach with China as it used with the
former Soviet Union, i.e., linking all political and economic dealings
with China to human rights.7 The resulting question becomes: is such
an approach effective?
While China is an illustration of the ineffectiveness of this method, it
is also an illustration of how trade is potentially the most effective
mechanism for the enforcement of human rights. In an increasingly
global economy, international trade is essential for the economic survival
and development of nearly all countries, as illustrated by the virtual
collapse of Iraq's economy due to internationally imposed trade and
economic sanctions Therefore, it can be convincingly argued that trade
5. See, e.g., Review and Outlook: Solving a Chinese Puzzle, WALL ST. J., May
11, 1994, at A14 (proposing alternatives to the linkage of trade with human rights for
President Clinton to pursue that would not cause the Chinese leaders to feel that the
United States is meddling in China's domestic affairs).
6. See Michael K. Frisby, U.S. Penalties on China Likely to Be Light, WALL
ST. J., May 25, 1994, at A3 (reporting that White House officials acknowledged that
President Clinton would renew China's most-favored nation status).
7. See Gerald Seib, Chinese Trade: A Useful Debate Becoming Sterile, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 2, 1994, at A12 (explaining the approach of the former Reagan and
Bush administrations with the former Soviet Union that forced then-President
Gorbachev to discuss the issue of human rights at every meeting conducted between
him and the President of the United States). The Helsinki Accords worked out three
"baskets" of cooperation, referring to security in Europe (Basket I); economics, sci-
ence, technology and the environment (Basket 11); and humanitarian affairs (Basket
ll). Michael F. Miley, The CSCE Process and the Question of Sovereignty, 19 S.U.
L. REv. 93, 96 (1992).
8. See Robert S. Greenburger, U.S. Faces Trouble in U.N. as Countries Soften
Their Stance on Iraq Oil Embargo, WALL ST. J., Mar. 28, 1994, at A9 (recognizing
the influence of trade sanctions in obtaining compliance from Iraq).
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sanctions are the most effective mechanism for the international enforce-
ment of human rights.
Why then do countries not use trade sanctions, or if they use them,
why do sanctions often fail? A number of reasons exist. First, the re-
gional human rights conventions currently in force, the United Nations'
favored method of human rights protection, do not provide for trade
sanctions as an enforcement mechanism Second, the sanctioned-nations
often react with refusals to comply with demands and with indignation
at what they perceive to be unmerited intrusions into their domestic
policies,"° a reaction that is entirely understandable in light of the polit-
ical underpinnings of the majority of sanctions. And third, the protected
rights, rights which are primarily political in nature, very often have no
place in the sanctioned country's domestic policy."
Therefore, for trade sanctions to be effective in the enforcement of
human rights, it is necessary to distinguish between rights that are capa-
ble of international enforcement and those that are not. Universally held
basic human rights must remain separate from political rights. Such
basic human rights are those that are so universal that all societies,
systems, nations and ideologies could, and do, espouse them. Converse-
ly, political rights are those that are dependent upon compatibility with
the system of government in place and are therefore far less likely to
garner universal support. An effective multilateral enforcement mecha-
nism can only succeed if there is universal agreement and acceptance of
the protected rights. Accordingly, at the outset of such a mechanism,
only basic human rights may be enforced through trade sanctions. Once
such a system is in place, more political rights may be included.
In Part I of this paper, I will briefly examine the history of the inter-
national enforcement of human rights. I will then describe human rights
9. See, e.g., European Social Charter, infra note 43, at 89 (guaranteeing funda-
mental rights to all individuals for the benefit of society without providing economic
sanction mechanisms to remedy violations).
10. See Andrew Wellington Cordier, South Africa: The Impact of Sanctions, 46 1.
INT'L AFF. 193, 193 (1992) (asserting that individual nations impose trade sanctions
that induce alterations in the sanctioned-nation's domestic policies); Adi Ignatius,
Many in China, Not Just Officialdom, Question the Effectiveness of Sanctions, VIALL
ST. J., Mar. 1, 1990, at A13 (chronicling the debate over extending sanctions against
China and the response of the Chinese government that such sanctions interfere with
Chinese affairs).
11. See infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text. (asserting that rights which are
political in nature would include, among others, democracy and freedom of speech,
and would thus not be compatible with all political systems).
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which are universally espoused and thus capable of garnering interna-
tional adherence. In this context, I will analyze the current methods for
the protection of human rights, specifically international and regional
conventions and unilateral sanctions, in terms of the reasons for their
successes and failures.
From this analysis, in Part II, I will propose a framework for an
apolitical, standardized system of trade sanctions for the enforcement of
basic human rights. Specifically, I will consider why such a system is
ideally compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT), 2 and therefore is within the provisions of the new World
Trade Organization (WTO). 3 In addition, I will propose the formation
of an international human rights body within the WTO, charged with
overseeing the administration of a system for multilateral enforcement of
human rights through trade sanctions. Finally, I will set out in detail the
procedural aspects of such a system in terms of investigative and appel-
late bodies as well as remedies for violations of human rights.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS PROTECTIONS TODAY
A. CAN HUMAN RIGHTS BE SUCCESSFULLY ENFORCED
AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL?
Regardless of the plethora of international treaties and agreements
created to protect human rights, commentators continually question
whether it is even possible to enforce effectively such rights on an
international level.14 One commentator noted that while there are nu-
merous United Nations' votes, international instruments for protection,
and state declarations, "for a large part of humanity, including a large
part of what we generally call the 'Western' world, observance of hu-
man rights is presently a dream of things to come" as opposed to a
reality. 5 Infringements on a state's sovereignty are one of the primary
reasons for the apparent failure to establish an effective international
12. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S. Unless otherwise specified, when referring to the
GATT, I am referring to all versions from the 1947 version to the 1994 version.
13. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, opened for signa.
ture Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13.
14. See, e.g., Seymour J. Rubin, Economic and Social Human Rights and the
New International Economic Order, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 67, 70-71 (1986)
(declaring that the state of humanity with regard to human rights remains bleak).
15. Id. at 71.
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regime for the enforcement of human rights. Few states wish to become
parties to treaties that interfere with their domestic policies, particularly
those policies regarding domestic treatment of their citizens. Moreover,
article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter prohibits the United Nations
from intervening in matters that are "essentially within the domestic ju-
risdiction of any state." 6 One may then question whether a state's
treatment of its citizens is truly a matter for international law, and there-
fore not subject to international enforcement in the event that a state
violates human rights. Yet, history shows that effective international
enforcement can happen.
One of the first international attempts at the enforcement of a human
right took place in the early nineteenth century with the international
effort to abolish slavery.' In 1814, the Treaty of Paris between France
and Great Britain established cooperation between the two nations in
order to suppress the traffic in slaves." Later, in the spring of 1890,
the major European powers held an anti-slave trade conference in Brus-
sels.19 The Belgian delegate later described the conference by stating
that "[n]ever before had all the Great Powers come together so single-
mindedly set on so generous, pure and disinterested a purpose to save
the 'oppressed and decimated' races of Africa and end the monstrous
trade in human flesh."'  At the end of the conference in July 1890,
delegates created and later ratified an anti-slavery act, providing mea-
sures for the suppression of slavery both in Africa and on the high
seas21 In addition, the act contained one of the earliest examples of
implementation in the guise of a special office attached to the Belgian
Foreign Ministry created to oversee the enforcement of the act.= Later,
the twentieth century saw the right to be free from enforced servitude
enshrined in many international human rights documents. Consequent-
16. U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, 7.




20. THOMAS PAKENHAM, THE SCRAMIBLE FOR AFRICA 397 (1991).
21. Id. at 399.
22. ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 15.
23. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 4, G.A. Res. 217A(u1),
U.N. Doc. 810 (1948) (prohibiting nations from holding humans in slavery or servi-
tude); see also International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 8(1), Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, reprinted in 6 LL.M. 368, 371 (precluding the institution
of slavery and compulsory labor to achieve the goal of promoting human rights and
19961
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ly, over a 150-year period, the prohibition against slavery became an
established rule of customary international law that, while not always
followed, nations universally accept as internationally enforceable.24
Despite this example, the question persists as to whether human rights
can, and should, be enforced internationally, or whether they are truly a
domestic concern of each state. In the late 1960s, one eminent commen-
tator, H. Lauterpacht, argued that any matter is essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction of a state only if international law does not regu-
late it or cannot regulate it.2s Lauterpacht contended that there are few
such matters, if any, and that if there are international repercussions,
international law governs.2 6 The profusion of international documents
entered into force in the latter half of the twentieth century addressing
the protection of human rights proved Lauterpacht correct by illustrating
that nations no longer regard human rights as merely domestic mat-
ters.27 Indeed, Lauterpacht maintained that once international obligations
govern an action, it no longer falls under domestic jurisdiction. 8 For
example, while a nation's duty to protect its citizens from slavery was
once a purely domestic matter,29 it is now a universally accepted duty
governed by international obligations.'
The main reason for the international acceptance of the freedom from
slavery as an internationally enforceable human right is the fact that it
transcends politics and economics. The freedom from enforced servitude
is a right that is basic to the citizens of any society, state or political
system. As such, it is one that may be, and has been, agreed to and en-
forced on an international level under the auspices of the United Nations
without any assertions by any members of interference in their domestic
political systems.
freedoms).
24. ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 10.
25. H. LAUTERPACHT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS 175 (1968).
26. Id.
27. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 360; International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23 (setting international standards and norms for
the treatment of humans to promote the right of self-determination).
28. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 25, at 176.
29. See ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 15 (discussing the 150-year transition on
the issue of slavery from being purely domestic to being solely under the authority of
international law).
30. Id. at 15.
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While some commentators argue that the primary purpose of the
United Nations is the enforcement of international peace and security,
there are those who assert that the United Nations has a second and
equally important purpose as evidenced in the Charter's preamble, name-
ly the international protection of human rights.3' Beyond the preamble,
other commentators point to Articles 13, 55, 68 and 76, which all ad-
dress human rights in various forms, thus establishing the United
Nations' competence and duty to protect human rightsO In addition,
most commentators now agree that article 2(7) allows the United Na-
tions to act to protect human rights, particularly because egregious viola-
tions of human rights represent a threat to international peace?'
However, while the United Nations may clearly recognize human
rights, it does not effectively enforce them. This lack of effective en-
forcement is due in large part to the expansiveness of the United
Nations' definition of what constitutes human rights. As the enforcement
of the prohibition of slavery suggests, however, if the enforced human
rights are truly universal in nature and apolitical, then effective interna-
tional enforcement is possible.
B. DEFINING CORE HUMAN RIGHTS
Definitions for human rights are numerous. Some say that human
rights are safeguarded prerogatives present because a person is alive, and
therefore any human being has rights by virtue of membership in the
species.' Human rights have also been defined as a "recognition of the
inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members
of the human family,"'3 and that this recognition is "the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world." In essence, the concept of
31. Michael Reisman & Myres S. McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Pro-
tect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERV.NTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 167, 178
(R. Lillich ed., 1973); F. TESON, HtmtANrrARiAN INT vlNTioN 131 (1988).
32. B.G. RAMCHARAN, THE CONCEPT AND PRESENT STATUS OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 267 (1989).
33. Oscar Schacter, United Nations Law, 88 AM. 1. INT'L L 1, 17 (1994);
Kristen Walker, An Exploration of Article 2(7) of the United Nations Charter as an
Embodiment of the PubliclPrivate Distinction in International Lav, 26 N.Y.U. J. INT'L
L. & PoL. 173, 180-81 (1994).
34. Ronald Cohen, Endless Teardrops: Prolegomena to the Study of Human
Rights in Africa, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND GOVERNANCE IN AFRICA 4 (Ronald Cohen
ed., 1993).
35. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, pmbl. cl. 1, supra note 23.
36. Id.
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human rights connotes the security of the individual or the group in the
face of power, and the justice due to those people by virtue of their
personhood.37
International declarations and conventions currently in force provide
lists of human rights, dividing them into civil and political rights, eco-
nomic and social rights, and collective rights." Other conventions es-
tablish protections against violations of specific human rights such as
racial discrimination,39  apartheid,' discrimination against women,"
and genocide.42 The regional conventions and declarations address the
protection of all these rights in varying forms and, to some extent, ex-
pand upon them.4'
Considering the various definitions of human rights as well as the
myriad of rights contained in the conventions, it becomes clear that two
types of rights are involved: the right to act in a particular manner and
the right to be free from a particular action upon oneself. Political and
37. Cohen, supra note 34, at 11; see Reisman & McDougal, supra note 31, at
172 (recognizing the significance of protecting individuals from state authority while
promoting the development of nations).
38. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23
(recognizing the essential rights of life, liberty, and self-determination for all individu-
als); see also International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra
note 27 (guaranteeing all individuals the right to work and education in order to
achieve goals of economic self-sufficiency).
39. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, reprinted in, 5 I.L.M. 352 (1966) [hereinafter Racial Dis-
crimination Convention].
40. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of
"Apartheid,", Nov. 30, 1973, 13 I.L.M. 50 [hereinafter Apartheid Convention].
41. Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Wom-
en, Dec. 18, 1979, 19 I.L.M. 33 (1980) [hereinafter Discrimination Against Women
Convention].
42. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
43. See European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89 (recognizing
that the enjoyment of social rights should be protected without discriminating against
an individual's race, sex, national extraction, or social origin); see also European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Human Rights Convention](securing the
rights of European citizens to life, liberty, and freedom from involuntary servitude);
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Nov. 22, 1969, 9 I.L.M. 673
[hereinafter American Human Rights Convention]; African Charter on Human and
People's Rights, June 26, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 59 [hereinafter African Human Rights
Charter] (requiring the contracting parties to recognize all individuals' equality and
rights to liberty and due process).
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economic rights address the ability to assert one's political opinions and
achieve wealth, and therefore act in a particular manner. The more basic
and passive rights address the right to be free from being acted upon in
some manner either because of some personal, immutable characteristic
or simply by virtue of one's personhood.
Some examples of the right to act in a particular manner include
freedom of speech," freedom of assembly,5 freedom of movement,
the right to work,47 and the right to vote.' All of these rights involve
the ability to act affirmatively in a manner that one chooses without
interference from, or denial by, the state. The existence of such rights
for the citizens of a state presupposes the compatibility of such rights
with the existing political system. Accordingly, such rights would not
exist and would be unenforceable in a system of government that does
not recognize political and economic rights such as the freedom of
speech. In light of the numerous political and economic systems in the
world that do not espouse all of these rights, there could be no univer-
sal adherence to an enforcement mechanism for them.
The more political of these rights, i.e., those having to do with gov-
ernment and governance, are intrinsically linked with the particular sys-
tem of government existing in a particular state. As there is no universal
agreement on a particular political system, there can be no universal
agreement on whether such political rights may be recognized or even
enforced. 9 The same can be said for economic rights. As there is no
universal agreement on which economic system is most desirable, there
can be no universal agreement on which economic rights should be
recognized and enforced. Further, one commentator has pointed out that
economic rights are even more difficult to enforce than political or basic
human rights as "it is easier to tell governments that they shall not
44. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 19, supra
note 23, at 374 (guaranteeing the right to express opinions freely and to discuss ideas
openly through various means).
45. Id art. 20.
46. Id. art. 12.
47. See, e.g., International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 27, art. 6 (providing the right to choose freely the course of work in
which an individual endeavors).
48. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 25.
49. As these rights are political, one may question whether they are human rights
which all persons possess, or whether they are rights bestowed by a government, i.e.,
whether they are entitlements or privileges.
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throw persons into jail without a fair trial than that they shall guarantee
a minimum standard of living.
50
Contrary to economic and political rights, the more basic, passive
rights do not depend upon the system of government or the economics
of a particular state. These rights fall into two categories: the right to be
free from actions taken upon oneself because of an immutable character-
istic such as race, gender or religion; and the right to be free from ac-
tions taken upon oneself simply by virtue of one's personhood. Exam-
ples of the former include the freedom from violent or discriminatory
acts based upon one's gender, race or religion. Examples of the latter
include freedom from acts such as torture and arbitrary detention not by
virtue of one's immutable characteristics. As to the category of religion,
it is arguable that religion is not an immutable characteristic in that it is
possible to change one's religion, whereas the definition of an immuta-
ble characteristic is one that is unchangeable. However, for purposes of
this paper, I will respect the belief that one's personal faith is immuta-
ble.
Important as the economic and political rights within the conventions
are, the inescapable fact is that not all countries or societies hold these
rights to be inalienable, compatible with their society, or even desirable.
For example, the United States does not consider the prohibition against
any dissemination of racially discriminatory language or information to
outweigh the freedom of speech guaranteed by the United States Consti-
tution, and has thus chosen to reserve that part of the convention ad-
dressing this prohibition.5 Alternatively, many countries do not espouse
the idea of complete freedom of speech as enshrined in the United
States Bill of Rights, 2 choosing instead to opt for a greater security
that results from the control of some types of speech, particularly the
media. 3 The consequence of such differing beliefs is either few
50. Rubin, supra note 14, at 82.
51. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 39, art. 4(a); S. ExEC. REP.
No. 29, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1994).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the
freedom of speech . . . ").
53. See David A. Cifrino, Press Freedom in Latin America and the Emerging
International Right to Communicate, 9 B.C. THmD WoRLD L.J. 117, 119 (1989) (dis-
cussing the increasing state control of media in Latin America); see also Hilary K.
Josephs, Defamation, Invasion of Privacy and the Press in the People's Republic of
China, 11 U.C.L.A. PAC. BASIN L.J. 191 (1993) (discussing the state-controlled media
in China).
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ratifications of the conventions, or ratifications with reservations reflect-
ing differing beliefs.
Another example of the widely differing opinions regarding which
rights are essential human rights is democracy. This article defines de-
mocracy as government in which sovereign power rests in the hands of
the citizens by way of direct or indirect representation through the right
to voteY' While this type of democracy may seem an inalienable hu-
man right to most industrialized nations, many developing countries have
for now chosen greater security through varying degrees of authoritarian-
ism 5 Very often, in some societies, sheer survival often takes prece-
dence over the attainment of democracy. On the other hand, one com-
mentator has questioned whether democracy is an entitlement in terms
of a human right to be protected by force.' The action recently taken
in Haiti by the United States under the authority of the Security Council
appears to be one of the first instances of armed force used to enforce
the political right of democracyY No European ally of the United
States nor any major government of this hemisphere, however, chose to
join the United States at the outset of this action except four Caribbean
islands,58 thus raising the question whether democracy is a universally
held human right that nations are willing to protect, restore or establish
by force in other nations. Further, it is questionable whether the protec-
tion by force of other human rights would garner greater international
support. While the international movement to end apartheid in South
Africa gained nearly universal support,' there was never any serious
contemplation that force from other nations would be utilized.0
54. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 432 (6th ed. 1990).
55. See Peter A. Samuelson, Pluralism Betrayed: The Battle Between Secularism
and Islam in Algeria's Quest for Democracy, 20 YAUI J. INT'L L 309 (1995) (dis-
cussing the conflict between the existing secular authoritarian state and the potential
authoritarian Islamic state).
56. Jeane Kirkpatrick, Is Democracy an Entitlement?, WASH. POsT, Sept. 12,
1994, at A23 (noting that "the idea of a 'Right of Democracy' that can be imposed
by force is a dramatic departure from previous theory and practice").
57. ld.
58. Id.
59. See Louis K. Rothenberg, Sections 402 and 403 of the Comprehensive Anti-
Apartheid Act of 1986, 22 GEO. NVASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 117 (1988) (equating
apartheid with war crimes in universal condemnation).
60. Cf. Jost Delbruck, A Fresh Look at Humanitarian Intervention Under the Au-
thority of the United Nations, 67 IND. LJ. 887, 897 (stating, "[Gleneral international
law does not offer any legal basis for . . . military, enforcement mechanisms in cases
of grave violations of human rights").
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On the other hand, it has become widely accepted that real and sus-
tained economic development is not possible without a respect for hu-
man rights.' Yet it is unclear which human rights must gain support in
order to facilitate sustained economic development. Moreover, is democ-
racy one of those human rights that must be respected in order for
economic development to take place? There can be no clear answer to
this question, particularly in light of China, a clearly non-democratic
nation with a booming economy but with an appalling record in the area
of human rights.62
The Clinton administration, perhaps in response to the human rights
situation in China, espouses the contrary belief that economic develop-
ment fosters a respect for human rights.63 Specifically, the administra-
tion argues that a growing economy made possible by greater trade
makes people more comfortable and therefore more likely to seek de-
mocracy.' Thus, it becomes necessary to question how economic de-
velopment can be measured in order to discern the level at which a
respect for human rights is possible. In addition, the result of this policy
appears to be that democracy is a human right that takes precedence
over, or is rather a precursor to, other human rights. While democracy is
just one of many human rights contained in the international conven-
tions, it is the human right that appears to have garnered the greatest
importance, attention and support.' This result is due to the expansive-
61. ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 13.
62. See China Keeps Favored Trade Status, Clinton Renews MFN, Blasts Asian
Giants Human Rights Record, SAN DiEGo UNION-TRiE., June 3, 1995, at A17 (citing
the numerous human rights violations that China commits, including the denial of
freedom of speech and press, association, and religion).
63. See President Lets China Keep its Trading Status: Clinton Concedes Serious
Abuses of Human Rights Continue There, SAN DiEGO UNION-TRIB., May 27, 1994, at
Al (recognizing the human rights abuses in China but refusing to link Most Favored
Nation trade status for China with improvement of human rights).
64. Paul Blustein & Thomas W. Lippman, Clinton Says Trade Boosts Right Is-
sues, WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 1994, at Al (quoting Clinton as saying, "Growth means
people are better off, and that in turn means they begin independently seeking demo-
cratic rights").
65. See, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 43,
art. 25 (providing every citizen the right to vote and take part in the conduct of pub-
lic affairs); see also American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 23 (de-
claring that all citizens have the right to vote); European Human Rights Convention,
supra note 43, pmbl., Protocol No. I to the European Convention, art. 3, 213
U.N.T.S. 262 (agreeing to hold free elections at reasonable intervals with secret bal-
lots); African Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 13 (recognizing the right
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ness of human rights to be protected by these conventions. The seem-
ingly endless lists of rights, to which universal adherence is consequent-
ly virtually impossible, appear to have had the effect of establishing a
hierarchy of rights with democracy apparently at the top with the more
universal and basic rights deemed less pressing, despite the fact that
democracy does not appear to be a universally held human right.'
There are some rights, other than democracy and other political and
economic rights, that are more universally espoused.' Indeed, there are
rights which are so universal that all societies, systems, nations and
ideologies would or do espouse them.' These rights are the most basic
of human rights, those rights which are not political or economic but
rather are passive rights.' For purposes of this paper, I will refer to
these as core human rights.
There are two types of core human rights. The first type of core
human rights are those rights derived from immutable characteristics
possessed by all human beings. The second type of core human rights
are those rights not derived from an immutable characteristic but are
possessed by virtue of personhood. As previously stated, immutable
characteristics include gender, religion, and race. A core human right
to express thoughts, and receive and disseminate information without government
restrictions); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 21 (stating
that all individuals share an equal right to participate in the government of the nation
directly or through freely chosen representatives); William Tuohy, Profile 'Good
Shepherd' Gathers E. European States to the Fold as Council of Europe Secretary
General, Catherine LaLumiere, Works to Bring Former East Bloc Members into Her
Organization to Help Them Smooth Their Transition to Democracy, LA. TIMES,
Mar. 19, 1991, at 2 (discussing how the Council of Europe, which represents 25 de-
mocracies, has the primary goal of promoting principles of democracy and human
rights in international conventions and treaties); Jon Ebersole, National Sovereignty
Revisited: Perspectives on the Emerging Norm of Democracy in International Law, 86
A.M. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROc. 249, 258 (1992) (discussing the Organization of American
States support of representative democracy in the hemisphere).
66. Ebersole, supra note 65, at 249-50 (attributing the lack of international recog-
nition of democracy as a universal human right to the fact that national elections are
a recent phenomenon and to the fact that, until recently, international law did not
concern itself with how states chose their governments).
67. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, art. 2 (pro-
hibiting discrimination based on, inter alia, race, religion, or sex), art. 4 (prohibiting
slavery), art. 5 (prohibiting torture), art. 9 (prohibiting arbitrary arrest).
68. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23; see also BARRY E.
CARTER & PHuip R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW SELECTED DoctmmNTs 352
(1991) (noting that no state voted against the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
69. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23.
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derived from an immutable characteristic is the right to be free from an
act taken upon oneself as a result of that immutable characteristic. Ac-
cordingly, a core human right would be, for example, the right to be
free from a non-political discriminatory act upon oneself based upon
one's race, gender or religion."
The second type of core human right encompasses the right to be free
from actions that are injurious to the inherent dignity and security of the
human being.7' For this reason, freedom from slavery, genocide, torture
and arbitrary imprisonment, are core human rights. While arguably a
government may legitimately deprive its citizens of political rights such
as democracy, freedom of speech and the press, it may not legitimately
deprive its citizens of the right to be free from slavery, genocide, torture
and arbitrary imprisonment. Therefore, it appears that of the two forms
of human rights, political/economic and core human rights, the latter are
more likely to be compatible with any system of government.
While all the enumerated rights within existing conventions are impor-
tant and arguably essential, not all of those rights are enforceable in
every nation of the world. This being the case, it has never been possi-
ble to achieve truly universal enforcement of human rights by way of
worldwide adherence to existing conventions. Because core human rights
appear to be universally held by all nations regardless of political belief,
however, they could be enforced on a worldwide basis, while the other,
more political and economic human rights, could not.
Such a tailoring of protected human rights is not a new idea. The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations (1987) contains a relatively
limited list of human rights to which customary international law ap-
pliesY Specifically, Section 702 provides that it is a violation of cus-
tomary international law if a state, as a matter of state policy, practices,
encourages or condones genocide, slavery, murder or disappearance of
persons, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, racial discrimination or a
consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
rights.73
Another document, the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International
Armed Conflicts74 (the Second Geneva Protocol), provides for certain
70. A denial of the right to vote based upon one's gender, race or religion
would not fall into this category as this would be the denial of a political right.
71. Cohen, supra note 34, at 10.
72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 702 (1987).
73. Id.
74. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Re-
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minimum rights for all persons affected by such conflict. These mini-
mum rights include freedom from torture, collective punishments, taking
of hostages, acts of terrorism, outrages upon personal dignity such as
rape, slavery, pillage, or threats to commit any of these acts 5 These
rights apply regardless of race, color, sex, language, religion, political
opinion, national or social origin, wealth, birth or other status!6
The very fact that the Second Geneva Protocol has gained wide ratifi-
cation illustrates that a more limited definition of human rights to be
enforced would be more apt to gain universal acceptance and respect.
By limiting the rights to be enforced to the core human rights accepted
by all, a truly effective enforcement mechanism could be achieved. Prior
to exploring the composition of such a mechanism, however, it is neces-
sary to examine the mechanisms now in place in terms of their provi-
sions as well as their successes and failures.
C. CURRENT PROTECTION MECHANISMS
Initially, it is necessary to note a matter of semantics. Current docu-
ments concerning human rights employ varying terms in the area of
human rights. Some documents refer to the "promotion" of human
rights,'7 while others refer to the "protection" of human rights in con-
junction with their promotion A majority of documents "recognize"
human rights.O No document, however, specifically refers to the "en-
forcement" of human rights.s' When one considers the definitions of
lating to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts (Protocol I),
adopted June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
75. Id. art. 4(2).
76. Id. art 2(1).
77. See, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23 (declaring
that the document represents the commitment of all peoples and nations to promote
respect for rights and freedoms).
78. African Human Rights Charter, supra note 43, pmbl.
79. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23,
pmbl. (citing the foundations of freedom, justice, and peace as the recognition of in-
herent dignity and inalienable rights of all individuals); see also American Human
Rights Convention, supra note 43, pmbl. (basing the essential rights of man in the
recognition that they are part of the human personality); European Human Rights
Convention, supra note 43, pmbl. (attempting to secure the effective and universal
recognition of human rights); African Human Rights Charter, supra note 43, pmbl.
(justifying the international and national protection of human rights on account of the
recognition of their essential attributes to human character).
80. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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these terms, the significance of the use of one term or the other be-
comes apparent and relevant to this discussion.
By considering the standard dictionary definition of the terms, it can
be said that "promotion" of human rights means the furtherance of the
establishment or advancement of those rights."' "Protect" refers to the
guarding against the loss of those rights.'2 "Enforcement," however,
means to compel the observance of those rights.83 Clearly, a document
containing the former terms carries far less force than one containing the
latter, particularly when a document using the word "enforcement" con-
tains effective mechanisms for achieving that end. None of the conven-
tions or declarations currently in force, however, utilizes the word "en-
forcement," opting instead for either the term "protection" or the term
"promotion."84
The seminal human rights document is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
1948.85 In its preamble, the declaration reaffirms the fundamental hu-
man rights in the United Nations Charter.8" The declaration then pro-
claims that it is to be "a common standard of achievement for all peo-
ples and all nations," and that "every organ of society" should "promote
respect" for these rights, thus implying that these rights already exist."
The rights contained within the document encompass political rights,88
economic rights 9 and core human rights such as freedom from racial
discrimination, 9' arbitrary arrest,9' torture,' and slavery." Being a
declaration, the document has no enforcement mechanisms and places no
81. THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTiONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1548 (2d ed.
1987).
82. Id. at 1553.
83. Id. at 644.
84. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. But see European Human Rights
Convention, supra note 43, pmbl. (stating that the European states would attempt "the
collective enforcement of certain of the rights stated in the Universal Declaration").
85. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23.
86. Id. pmbl.
87. Id.
88. Id. art. 21 ("Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his
country, directly or through freely chosen representatives").
89. Id. arts. 17, 22-25 ("Everyone, as a member of society, has the right to so-
cial security .... ").
90. Id. art. 2.
91. Id. art. 9.
92. Id. art. 5.
93. Id. art. 4.
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obligations on parties.' It is merely, as its preamble states, "a common
standard of achievement."' The Declaration has over time, however,
acquired authority as customary international law in the preservation of
human rights.'
From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came two cove-
nants: The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,' and The International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights,9 both entered into force in 197609 Both covenants conform
with, as well as expand upon, the Universal Declaration."°
In the area of protection and promotion of human rights, the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains a
provision whereby parties agree to submit reports to the Secretary Gen-
eral on the measures they have taken to achieve conformity with the
rights contained within the covenant."' The reports are then transmit-
ted to the Economic and Social Council which in turn may transmit the
reports to the Commission on Human Rights for study and recommenda-
tion."m In addition, article 23 provides that "international action for the
achievement of the rights recognized ... includes such methods as the
conclusion of conventions, the adoption of recommendations, the furnish-
ing of technical assistance and the holding of regional meet-
ings .. . .", Such methods, while possibly effective for promotion of
human rights, cannot be seen as effective for enforcement.
94. THomAs BUERGENTHAL & HAROLD G. MAIER, PUBUC INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN A NuTsHELL 119 (1990) (noting that the U.N. General Assembly adopted the dec-
laration in the form of a non-binding resolution"); see Robertson, supra note 17, at
26 ("[The Declaration] was not intended to impose legal obligations on states").
95. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 23, pmbl.
96. ROBERTSON, supra note 18, at 27 ("[M]any of (the Declaration's) principles
can now be regarded as part of customary law").
97. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
27; see ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 27 (noting that U.N. G.A. Resolution 217(E11),
adopting the Universal Declaration of Rights, also called for work on the covenants to
the Declaration).
98. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23.
99. Id. pmbl.; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
supra note 27, pmbl.
100. See supra note 99.
101. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
27, art. 16(1).
102. Id. art. 16(2).
103. Id art. 23.
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The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides for
a Human Rights Committee to which states parties submit progress
reports on measures they have taken to achieve the rights contained
within the covenant."l Unlike the International Covenant for Econom-
ic, Social and Cultural Rights, however, article 41 of this covenant pro-
vides for the submission of communications by one state party to the
Committee concerning claims that another state party is not fulfilling its
obligations under the covenant."5 Under article 41, the Committee may
then bring the matter to the attention of the state party so accused.' 6
That state party must then communicate with the accusing state within
three months as to domestic procedures and remedies taken."l If there
is no settlement, either may present the matter to the Committee which
will then examine the situation and issue a report.' Additionally, if
the matter is not settled, article 42 provides that the Committee may
appoint an ad hoc Conciliation Commission which may also examine the
situation and issue a report." These provisions illustrate more exten-
sive mechanisms for protection than those in the International Covenant
for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, yet none that could be charac-
terized as effective enforcement. Further, while an optional protocol,
entered into force in 1976, permits petitions from individuals and non-
governmental organizations,"0 few states have chosen to adopt it."'
Worse still, those states that have not adopted the protocol include those
with the worst records on human rights."2
In addition to the general lack of acceptance of the Optional Protocol,
there have been questions as to the efficacy of the reporting require-
ments in these documents." 3 As stated above, both covenants require
states parties to submit reports to the Secretary General as to progress
they have made in implementing the provisions of the covenants."4
104. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 23, art. 40.
105. Id. art. 41(1).
106. Id. art. 41(1)(a).
107. Id. art. 41(1)(a).
108. Id. art. 41(1)(b)-(h).
109. Id. art. 42(1)(a).
110. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
Dec. 16, 1966, U.N. G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI), reprinted in 6 I.L.M. 383 (entered into
force in 1976).
111. See CARTER & TRIMBLE, supra note 68, at 373 (noting that only 48 coun-
tries are parties to the optional protocol).
112. ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 65.
113. Id. at 41.
114. See supra notes 101, 104 and accompanying text (stating that under both the
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These reports are compiled by national officials who are unlikely to call
the attention of an international body to their failures in the area of
human rights."' Moreover, the reports cannot act as an enforcement
mechanism unless independent persons, who are not governmental of-
ficials, follow-up with examination of the information, and unless an in-
ternational body takes enforcement action."6 Yet, regardless of these
shortcomings, it cannot be denied that the very existence of these cove-
nants is an important step toward the international protection of human
rights.
Beyond these covenants, there are a number of international docu-
ments addressing specific violations of human rights, all with varying
provisions of enforcement."' Some, such as the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, contain
the same type of enforcement mechanism as noted above, i.e., reports by
states parties to a committee."' Other documents contain more specific
methods of enforcement that have a punitive tone."" For example, the
Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Geno-
cide" and the International Convention on the Suppression and Pun-
ishment of the Crime of "Apartheid"' 2' contain provisions requiring
states parties to enact legislation to give effect to the conventions,'" as
well as to try those charged with genocide and apartheid in competent
tribunals in the state." Notably, these conventions declare genocide
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, "[a]ll reports shall be submitted to the Secre-
tary-General of the United Nations" who then conveys the reports to the respective
committees in order to monitor compliance).
115. ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 41.
116. Id. at 41-42.
117. See, e.g., Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 39 (requiring that,
"[elach State Party undertakes to encourage, where appropriate .... multi-racial orga-
nizations and movements and other means of eliminating barriers between races, and
to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial division").
118. Id. art. 9.
119. See Genocide Convention, supra note 42, art. IV (mandating that, "[p]ersons
committing genocide ... shall be punished, whether they are constitutionally respon-
sible rulers, public officials, or private individuals").
120. Id. art. IV.
121. Apartheid Convention, supra note 40.
122. Genocide Convention, supra note 42, art. V; Apartheid Convention, supra
note 40, art. IV.
123. Genocide Convention, supra note 42, art. VI; Apartheid Convention, supra
note 40, art. V.
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and apartheid to be not simply violations of human rights, but also
crimes against humanity and in violation of international law) 24 More-
over, as violations are considered international crimes, they invoke indi-
vidual punishment, a response that exists in no other document.
While genocide and apartheid are considered international crimes, two
equally heinous acts, torture and slavery, are not considered crimes as
such under international law, but rather acts violative of fundamental
freedoms and human rights."2 Article 2 of the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, provides that there can be no justification for torture under any
circumstances."2 Further, under article 2, orders from superior officers
or public authorities cannot be invoked as a justification for torture. 7
Article 2 also provides that each state party must take effective mea-
sures to ensure that torture is an offense under its law and to prevent it,
thus removing torture from the sphere of international crimes and adding
it to the sphere of domestic crimes." Articles 17 and 19 of the Con-
vention provide for a Committee against Torture to which states parties
must submit reports on measures taken to give effect to the Conven-
tion."9 Under article 22, the Committee may also receive communica-
tions from states parties regarding violations of other states, and from
individuals, provided that the individuals have exhausted all other reme-
dies."3 Ultimately, however, prosecution in domestic tribunals is the
only means of effective enforcement, and as such, enforcement is depen-
dent upon the strength of those domestic tribunals.
In addition to these international documents based upon the United
Nations Charter and Declaration of Human Rights, there are also region-
al conventions for the protection of human rights.' Originally, the
124. Apartheid Convention, supra note 40, at 1(1); Genocide Convention, supra
note 42, pmbl., art I.
125. See, e.g., Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman, or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, pmbl., G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., reprinted
in 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535 (1985) [hereinafter Torture
Convention] ("considering the obligation of States under the Charter . . . to promote
universal respect for . . . human rights and fundamental freedoms . . .
126. Id. art. 2(2).
127. Id. art. 2(3).
128. Id. art. 2(1).
129. Id. art. 2(1).
130. Id. art. 22.
131. See supra note 43 (explaining the establishment of a commission or court or
both to protect human rights).
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concept of regional enforcement was not favored by the United Nations
due to the perception that "it might detract from the perceived universal-
ity of human rights"." As regional regimes developed, however, resis-
tance by the United Nations decreased.'33 Finally, in 1977, by way of
Resolution 32/127, the General Assembly asked states not belonging to
regional regimes to consider agreements to establish such a regime with-
in their region."M Commentators have noted several reasons for the ac-
ceptance and greater possible efficacy of regional regimes such as the
general homogeneity of regions and a geographic proximity that leads to
greater interdependence and cooperation.' In addition, the regional, as
opposed to universal, aspects of the regimes provide a greater chance
for the investigation and remedying of violations." Currently, three re-
gional regimes are in force: The European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,"a The American Con-
vention on Human Rights,' and African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights.
3 9
All three conventions address much the same political, civil and eco-
nomic rights as the United Nations' conventions. Both the European
Convention and the American Convention provide for human rights
commissions (the European Commission of Human Rights and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights)' and human rights courts
(the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights).'" Both conventions provide standing for states, groups
and individuals before either the commission or the court.'" The Afri-
132. Burns H. Weston et al., Regional Human Rights Regimes: A Comparison and
Appraisal, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 585, 588 (1987).
133. Id. at 591.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 589-90.
136. Id.
137. European Human Rights Convention, supra note 43.
138. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43.
139. African Human Rights Charter, supra note 43. While the European Conven-
tion is the oldest of the three, it was preceded by the American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, a document somewhat similar to the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.
140. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 33(a); European
Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 19(a).
141. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 33(b); European
Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 19(b).
142. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, ar. 44 (according to
article 61, only state parties can bring a claim before the court); European Human
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can Convention provides for a commission, but not a court. 43 All
three provide for submission of petitions to their commissions from
those who feel their rights under the conventions have been violated.""'
Most commentators agree that the European convention has functioned
well. 45 Between 1953, its first year of legal effect, and 1990, 15,000
applications alleging violations were accepted for review by the commis-
sion." The majority of these applications came from individuals. 47
These petitions led to 244 cases before the European Court of Human
Rights with 129 judgments against states." All judgments in which
the state lost were accepted by the member states, thus illustrating a
willingness on the part of Western European states to accept judgment
by an international court. 4 One commentator has pointed out, howev-
er, that the membership obligations of this effective regime may prove
too demanding for European states just emerging from communism. 5
The Inter-American Convention allows individuals or groups to peti-
tion the Inter-American Commission concerning violations of rights
under the convention. 5' The Commission then conducts investigations,
including on-site investigations.'52 However, while the Commission
conducts more on-site investigations than any other similar body in the
world, it is able to pursue only a small number of the petitions it re-
ceives.' 3 Following investigations, the Commission attempts to achieve
a friendly settlement between parties, an example of which concerned
the Argentinean government's arbitrary detention of citizens in the 1980s
Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 25 (according to article 44, only High Con-
tracting Parties can file a complaint with the court).
143. African Human Rights Charter, supra note 43, art. 30.
144. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 44; European Human
Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 25; African Human Rights Charter, supra note
43, art. 47.
145. See, e.g., DAVID P. FORSYTHE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE NEW EUROPE 182
(1994) (noting that the Council of Europe "produced the most authoritative and effec-




149. Id. at 182-83.
150. FORSYTHE, supra note 145, at 184.
151. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43, art. 44.
152. Id. art. 48.
153. David J. Padilla, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the
Organization of American States: A Case Study, 9 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 95,
101 (1993).
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and the government's subsequent enforcement of the Commission's
recommendations concerning compensation."s The Commission also
functions as a "gatekeeper" to the Inter-American Human Rights Court
by selecting cases to be taken before the court.L ' While private parties
may not litigate cases before the court, their attorneys may act as legal
advisors to the Commission.'56 Some examples of this were cases con-
cerning disappearances in Honduras in which attorneys for Americas
Watch participated as legal advisors, as well as cases against Suriname,
Peru and Colombia."s One major difference between the Inter-Ameri-
can system and the European system is the fact that all member states
of the Council of Europe have ratified the European Convention, while
only two-thirds of the member states of the Organization of American
States have ratified the Inter-American Convention."
The African Charter for Human and Peoples' Rights encompasses
many of the same rights as the two other regional conventions, but with
some important differences.5 9 As one commentator has pointed out,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the other regional char-
ters embody a more Western tradition of the rights of the autonomous
individual."W The aim of the African Charter is to eliminate apartheid,
discrimination, and the remnants of colonialism. 6' The rights contained
in the charter are the rights of "peoples" and based upon the group
norm rather than the rights of the individual, thus reflecting the
communitarian aspects of African society.'" Another difference be-
tween the African Charter and the other regional conventions is the lack
of a human rights court.6 As the authors of the charter explained,
disputes are settled in a more traditional manner of friendly arbitration
rather than in the adversarial manner of the West.'
154. ld. at 107.
155. Id. at 108.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 108-09.
158. Id. at 109-10.
159. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 86-87 (1992) (stating that the African Charter shares in a "textu-
al convergence regarding freedom of expression" with several other regional charters).
160. Julia Swanson, The Emergence of New Rights in the African Charter, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & Cois!'. L. 307, 329-30 (1991).
161. Id. at 309.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 330.
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While the Arab states and Asia have not created regional human
rights regimes, they have taken some steps toward the protection of hu-
man rights.'65 In 1968, the Council of the Arab League adopted a res-
olution relating to the creation of a Permanent Arab Commission on
Human Rights.'6 Subsequently, the Council of the Arab League draft-
ed a declaration for an Arab Charter of Human Rights containing all the
rights and freedoms proclaimed by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights. 67 The draft contained what one commentator referred to as a
three-fold objective: "[A] concern for continuity with the past, a desire
to achieve Arab unity,... [and] a call for justice in respect of the
Arab populations living in the occupied territories."'" To date, the
draft has not been ratified.
As for Asia, there have been some non-governmental movements such
as the Permanent Standing Committee on Human Rights created in 1979
by Lawasia, a professional association of Asian and Western Pacific
lawyers. 69 However, the vast differences in culture, political ideology
and economic development among Asian nations, coupled with a lack of
a regional organization, have made a cohesive policy on human rights
impossible. 70
As can be seen, many, if not most, nations participate to varying
degrees in multilateral attempts at the protection of human rights
through international or regional conventions."' Some nations, howev-
165. See ROBERTSON, supra note 17, at 196-200 (discussing the creation of the
Permanent Arab Commission on Human Rights on September 3, 1968, which was an-
nounced at the Arab Regional Conference on Human Rights in Beirut in December
1968).
166. Id.
167. B. BOuTROS-GHALi, The League of Arab States, in THE INTERNATIONAL
DIMENSIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 575, 579 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982).
168. Id.
169. HIROKO YAMANE, Asia and Human Rights, in THE INTERNATIONAL DIMEN-
SIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS 651, 664 (Karel Vasak ed., 1982).
170. Id. at 651.
171. See, e.g., United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
44/25, U.N. G.A.O.R. 3d Comm., 61st Plen. Mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. A/44/736 (1989)
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448, 1456-57 (creating international recognition of the rights
of children); European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Europe T.S. No. 126, (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1990)
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1154 (establishing a committee to oversee the prevention of
torture of European citizens); Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Tor-
ture, Organization of American States (O.A.S.) T.S., No. 67, reprinted in 25 I.L.M.
519 (noting that 11 countries signed the text as of March 31, 1986).
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er, such as the United States, have also chosen to act unilaterally by
way of sanctions when they feel another country is violating human
rights.'" More often than not, the right being violated has been de-
mocracy. The United States uses unilateral action as the predominant
method by which it involves itself in the international human rights
sphere, particularly in its encouragement of democracy."
D. INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS BY THE UNITED STATES
Ironically, the United States, which has always considered itself an
international symbol of the protection of human rights, has not been a
consistent participant in the international enforcement of human rights
through the operation of conventions and treaties. Rather, the United
States often acts unilaterally in response to what it considers to be vio-
lations of human rights. 74 Its actions take the form of both sanctions
and, most recently in the case of Haiti, armed force.'75 Other nations
172. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C.S. § 2304(d)(1) (1994) (stating that the United States will
consider "gross violator[s] of internationally recognized human rights" as a basis for
denying security assistance); 19 U.S.C.S. § 2432 (1994) (denying "most favored na-
tion" status for countries that deny or financially burden emigration); 22 U.S.C.S.
§ 2295(9) (1994) (discussing United States policy of "conditioning aid" to former
Soviet Union countries on the basis of complying with internationally recognized
human rights).
173. See Michael Oksenberg, Heading Off a New Cold War with China: Hillary,
Harry and the New Politics of Asia, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 1995, at C1 (stating that
many Asian leaders will not join the United States in an anti-China crusade). Many
Asian leaders do not view China as a serious human rights offender. Id. Sean
Somerville, Daschle Warns About Lifting Arms Embargo: Pressler Says U.S. Must
Stay Out, GANNErT NEws, July 25, 1995 (claiming that the United States would get
involved in a massive unilateral action for lack of any other country taking action
against the serious human rights violations); James Finerock, Clinton Wimps Out: A
Centerpiece of the President's New China Human Rights Policy is an Empty Rice
Bowl of File-and-Forget Nostrums, S.F. EXAMINER, Mar. 30, 1995, at A20 (discussing
inherent problems concerning use of unilateral actions).
174. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (indicating the unilateral action
of the United States against China for human rights violations and the unilateral lift-
ing of the arms embargo by the United States in the Balkans would harm United
States interests).
175. See David L. Marcus, The Cold War Ended and the Players Moved On,
DALLAS MORNING Navs, Aug. 7, 1994, at 1R (discussing the United States use of
armed force against Haiti); Bruce Fein, No Queensbury Rules for Castro, WVASH.
TIMEs, May 22, 1995, at A20 (claiming that the United States is often viewed as an
"invincible weapon against repressive governments abroad").
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have also used sanctions as an enforcement mechanism for human
rights, but the United States by far is the most active in this area.'76
By way of illustration, between 1973 and 1983, the United States insti-
tuted sanctions against thirteen countries it deemed to be violating hu-
man rights.7
Historically, while often inclined to employ unilateral actions when it
feels another nation is violating human rights, the United States has
been reluctant to become a party to international conventions for the
protection of human rights.' In the mid-1950s, Senator John Bricker
of Ohio introduced an amendment to the United States Constitution that
required implementing legislation rather than just the advice and consent
of the Senate for treaties to have a binding effect in this country." 9
The targets for this amendment were the international human rights
treaties and conventions then being debated.Iw The American Bar As-
sociation agreed with Bricker, predicting serious consequences in the
guise of encroachment on the sovereignty of the United States, the loss
of states' rights, and greater Soviet influence in the event the Senate
ratified the treaties without implementing legislation) 8' While Senator
Bricker's amendment ultimately failed, "Brickerism" has lived on, result-
ing in a continuing hesitation on the part of the United States to ratify
international human rights conventions.' The interpretation persists
that human rights treaties are non-self-executing, thereby making ratifica-
tion without time-consuming implementing legislation difficult.' Fur-
ther, without United States ratification, United States courts never inter-
176. See, e.g.. I GARY C. HUFBAUER ET" AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSID-
ERED 336 (1990) (listing 13 individual incidences of the use of sanctions by the Unit-
ed States).
177. See id. (stating that the countries against whom the United States instituted
sanctions include South Korea (1973), Chile (1973), Uruguay (1976), Ethiopia (1976),
Paraguay (1977), Guatemala (1977), Argentina (1977), El Salvador (1977), Brazil
(1977), U.S.S.R. (1978) (regarding dissident trials), Bolivia (1979), Suriname (1982)
(with the Netherlands), and Grenada (1983) (with the OECS)).
178. See James F. Smith, NAFTA and Human Rights: A Necessary Linkage, 27
U.C. DAvis L. REv. 793, 806 (1994) (explaining that the United States has consented
to three of the seven major United Nations human rights instruments).
179. Id. at 807.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 807-08.
182. Id. at 807.
183. Id. at 808.
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pret these treaties, thereby depriving other tribunals of United States
case law on the meaning of these treaties.'
The litany of treaties and conventions to which the United States has
yet to become a party includes the American Convention on Human
Rights," the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights,"8 the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimi-
nation against Women," and, at the time of this writing, the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion." The United States ratified the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, but not until twenty-eight
years after the initial transmission to the Senate." In 1988, the United
States ratified the Convention Against Torture, but only after adding
numerous reservations regarding, among others things, the death penalty
and the definition of torture."l The reservations include almost all pos-
sible defenses to a torture prosecution.' In addition, the United States
recently ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
albeit with five reservations, five understandings and four declara-
tions."l The United States chose not to adopt the optional protocol al-
lowing individual petitions.93 In short, these ratifications can be inter-
184. Id. at 808.
185. American Human Rights Convention, supra note 43. While President Carter
did sign the American Convention on Human Rights in 1977, he included numerous
reservations and did not accept the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights. Id. The Senate has yet to ratify this convention. Id.
186. International Covenant on Economics, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note
27.
187. Discrimination Against Women Convention, supra note 41.
188. Racial Discrimination Convention, supra note 39 (entered into force Jan. 4
1969).
189. Genocide Convention, supra note 42 (entered into force for the United States
Feb. 23, 1989).
190. Smith, supra note 178, at 829-30. No implementing legislation for this con-
vention has been passed at the time of this writing, nor have instruments of ratifica-
tion been deposited. Id.
191. Id.
192. David P. Stewart, Text of U.S. Reservations, Understandings and Declarations,
reprinted in U.S Ratification of the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: The Sig-
nificance of the Reservations, Understandings and Declarations, 14 Htm. Rrs. L.J.
77, 123 (1993). In ratifying this convention, the United States included an understand-
ing that the Covenant would be implemented by the federal government "to the extent
that it exercises legislative and judicial jurisdiction over the matter covered and other-
wise by the state and local governments." Id.
193. Id.
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preted as a willingness on the part of the United States to appear to be
a party, but not allow itself to assume all obligations contained in the
treaties. The apparent reluctance of the United States to assume interna-
tional obligations is a major stumbling block to a concerted international
effort at enforcing human rights: the largest and most powerful democra-
cy in the world is largely absent from the multilateral protection of
human rights.
Rather than becoming an international participant in the multilateral
enforcement of human rights through ratification of the conventions, the
United States has, in recent years, preferred the use of unilateral actions
such as sanctions. 4 These actions have often linked human rights to
trade as in the recent China dispute and in numerous other instances. 5
The United States, however, also linked military assistance to human
rights, as country-specific riders attached to military aid bills denying or
reducing aid to certain countries in the 1970s and 1980s.'96 In addi-
tion, in 1976, Congress authorized and directed executive directors of
the Inter-American Development Bank and the African Development
Fund to vote against loans to countries violating human rights."
Another example of actions taken by the United States unilaterally to
address perceived violations of human rights was the enactment of sec-
tion 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974.' Section 502B be-
gins by stating that the principle goal of the foreign policy of the Unit-
ed States, "in accordance with its international obligations as set forth in
the Charter of the United Nations and in keeping with the constitutional
heritage and traditions," is to "promote and encourage increased respect
for human rights."'" Accordingly, "no security assistance may be pro-
vided to any country the government of which engages in a consistent
pattern of gross violations of internationally recognized human
194. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (claiming that United States uni-
lateral sanctions against China due to its human rights violations have only antago-
nized China).
195. 1 HUFBAUER, supra note 176. These instances included Uruguay (1976) (ex-
port sanctions), Ethiopia (1976) (import sanctions), Argentina (1977) (export sanctions),
U.S.S.R. (1978) (export sanctions), and Grenada (1983) (export and import sanctions).
Id.
196. 1 HUFBAUER, supra note 176, at 336. Those countries included South Korea,
Chile, Uruguay, the Philippines, Brazil, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay,
Ethiopia, Argentina and Zaire. Id.
197. Id. at 337.
198. Foreign Assistance Act § 502(b), 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1974).
199. Id.
[VOL. 11: 1
1996] TRADE SANCTIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS 29
rights."'  In compliance with this statute, the State Department com-
piled human rights reports, not all of which met with a greater willing-
ness on the part of the listed countries to increase their respect for hu-
man rights."' In 1977, in response to the State Department's list
which included eighty-two countries, five Latin American countries (El
Salvador, Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala and Uruguay) renounced United
States military aid in protest.' In the ensuing years, Section 502B ap-
pears to have receded in importance with the increasing reluctance to tie
human rights to aid.
Another way in which the United States enforces international human
rights is through the Alien Tort Statute,' which provides that district
courts have original jurisdiction over civil actions by aliens for a tort
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States. 5 This statute was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of
1789. The most famous use of this statute was the case of Filartiga
v. Pena-Iralam in which the Second Circuit held that a citizen of Par-
aguay could sue another citizen of Paraguay in the United States for
wrongful death by official torture.' The court held that because offi-
cial torture was a crime prohibited by the law of nations, such an action
was tenable under the Alien Tort Statute.' Under the statute, the
United States provides victims of human rights abuses falling under the
200. See, e.g., DEP'T. OF STATE, HOUSE CoMM. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, S. COmL.
ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 102d Cong., 2d Sess., COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuMIAN
RIGHTs PRACrICES FOR 1991, at IX (Joint Comm. Print 1992) (noting "an upsurge on
all continents of serious armed clashes and human rights abuse stemming from ethnic
and religious differences"); BUREAU OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, No.
6, ANNUAL HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT 102 (1991) (noting the human rights abuses dur-
ing Iraq's invasion of Kuwait).
201. See supra note 200.
202. 1 HUFBAUER, supra note 176, at 336.
203. Id. at 339. In November 1983, President Reagan specifically vetoed legislation
tying a continuation of aid to progress on human rights. Id.
204. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988). In 1992, this statute was amended to include pro-
visions regarding liability and the definitions of extrajudicial killing and torture. Id. In
addition, the statute now requires exhaustion of remedies in the home country and
provides a statute of limitations of 10 years. Id. §§ 2-3 (1993).
205. Id.
206. Daniel S. Dokos, Enforcement of International Human Rights in the Federal
Courts after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 67 VA. L. REv. 1376 (1981).
207. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 884-87.
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law of nations with a forum for redress. For the most part, however, the
United States acts in a more concerted manner using sanctions and di-
plomacy.
In recent years, the United States has used trade and economic sanc-
tions, or the threat of such sanctions, in its efforts to promote human
rights."' Two examples of this are Burma and China.2"' Yet, while
arguably effective to a certain extent, the unilateral use of economic
might by the United States has not contributed to an internationally co-
hesive effort at the enforcement of human rights.
Further, the actions of the United States appear to have engendered a
great wariness towards the United States on the part of smaller nations,
particularly those of South and Central America." 2 Rather than joining
its neighbors in the collective enforcement of human rights by way of
conventions and the like, the United States appears instead to its neigh-
bors to be inflicting its beliefs upon them. One commentator has said
that the United States actions have resulted in dominant exertions of
power rather than examples of leadership and have crippled the effec-
tiveness of the American Convention." 3 Consequently,. its South Amer-
ican neighbors appear to look upon the United States as an "imperialis-
tic democracy."1 4 In addition to a wariness, there is resentment on the
part of those neighbors as a result of the refusal of the United States to
join in the regional regimes to protect human rights.1 5 This resentment
is perhaps due to the manner in which the United States appears to be
quick to judge what it deems to be its neighbors' violations of human
rights, while seemingly not allowing any judgment of its own possible
violations.1 6
210. See supra note 173 and accompanying text (describing the United States uni-
lateral use of trade and economic sanctions in the past).
211. See Globalization of Rights Stressed for Asia, DAILY YomIJRI, July 26, 1995,
at 8 (reporting that Burma recently released opposition leader Aung San suu Kyi after
six years of house arrest, due in part, to the United States use of economic sanc-
tions); A Look Around the World, CHI. SuN-TIMEs, Jan. 1, 1995, at 28 (discussing
the United States threat to impose heavy trade sanctions on China unless it agreed to
put a stop to its unauthorized copying of American computer software, movies, books,
and music).
212. See Smith, supra note 178, at 812-13 (describing the angry and defensive
reaction of Mexican officials when the Clinton Administration proposed sending a
group of international observers to monitor Mexico's elections in 1994).
213. Id. at 816.
214. Id. at 816.
215. See id. at 812 (citing the resistance by the United States to the O.A.S. hu-
man rights regime).
216. See id. at 812 (comparing and contrasting the fact that the United States
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Unilateral actions by the United States also have another adverse
effect: that of garnering support not for the United States, but rather for
the object of those actions, as was recently seen in the case of Bur-
ma."" The United States policy towards Burma's brutal regime218
was to isolate the country by cutting off all trade. No Asian nation
would cooperate with the United States, however, forcing it to reopen
talks with Burma's leaders." 9 During trade talks in Indonesia in No-
vember 1994, Chinese President Jiang Zemin stated that many Asian
nations, including China, reject the United States view that individual
liberty and political freedom are fundamental human rights that take
precedence over an entire nation's stability and the communal rights of
its citizens? Burma, in comparison to the United States, is an illus-
tration of the widely divergent views of what constitutes essential human
rights. Burma is also an example of the less than successful attempts of
the United States to act independently as the world's arbiter of human
rights.
The participation of the United States, arguably the most powerful and
influential country in the world, would greatly add to the strength of the
international and regional human rights conventions. As a result, an
enormous gulf is left by its failure to participate. The reason for the
United States failure to join can be explained even more simply than
asserting that it is the result of continuing Brickerism. As stated above,
the very expansiveness of the human rights to be protected in the inter-
national documents makes them unenforceable even by those countries
applies pressure on Latin American countries to ratify the American Convention, yet
President Carter signed the American Convention contingent upon numerous reserva-
tions).
217. Ross Howard, Canada Puts Trade Before Rights, TORON'o GLOBE & MAIL.
May 12, 1995, at Al. Canada's government, in agreement with ASEAN, announced
its intent to sever the link between human rights and trade, particularly in regard to
Burma and China. Id. Canada's Foreign Relations Minister, Andre Ouellet, stated that
the best way to promote democratic development is through developing trade, regard-
less of whether other governments are in agreement with Canada's beliefs about hu-
man rights. Id.
218. 2 HuFBAuER, supra note 176, at 610-11. In August 1988, Burmese govern-
ment security forces fired at unarmed pro-democracy demonstrators throughout the
country, killing at least 3,000 in the capital city of Rangoon alone. Id. The killing of
unarmed demonstrators in large numbers continued through 1988. Id.
219. Thomas Lippman, Asian Nations Often Defy U.S. Wishes, WASH. POsT,
Nov. 15, 1994, at A14.
220. See id. (referring to the right to act affirmatively in a non-political manner,
such as freedom of speech and other social and economic freedoms).
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considered most protective of human rights, including the United States.
Conversely, the occasional success of the United States unilateral actions
of trade and economic sanctions shows that trade can be an effective
enforcement mechanism above and beyond the mechanisms contained in
the international and regional conventions.'
One example of the efficacy of United States policy is sanctions
against Argentina, in the form of aid reduction in 1977 to protest human
rights violations by the military-controlled government." The United
States sanctions may have influenced the eventual democratic election of
Raul Alfonsin in 1983, who became the head of the first civilian gov-
ernment in Argentina in a decade.' One commentator also wrote that
United States economic sanctions helped to topple Haiti's Jean-Claude
Duvalier in 1986, Uganda's Idi Amin in 1979, Chile's Salvador Allende
in 1973, and the Dominican Republic's Anastasio Trujillo in 1961.'
Another example is the overthrow of President Anastasio Somoza of
Nicaragua, in part due to the denial of military aid by the United States
in 1977-79.' However, the case of Nicaragua is also an example of
the weakness of unilateral action. In 1979, the IMF approved of loans to
the Somoza government despite the United States position regarding the
denial of military aid to Nicaragua due to human rights violations.1
6
Clearly, sanctions are only effective if all alternative sources and
markets are cut off from the target of those sanctions, as illustrated by
the current situation in Iraq. 7 Cutting off virtually all of Iraq's mar-
kets through international cooperation has brought that country's econo-"
my to its knees," thus proving that the true strength of sanctions is





224. Barry E. Carter, International Economic Sanctions: Improving the Haphazard
U.S. Legal Regime, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1163 (1987).
225. 2 HUFBAUER, supra note 176, at 452-53.
226. Id.
227. Mark Fineman, Iraq on Brink of Famine, U.N. Finds Destitution: Sanctions
are Blamed, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 8, 1993, at 4. The United Nations imposed internation-
al trade sanctions on Iraq in 1990. Id.
228. Id. United Nations reports concluded that Iraq is on the brink of a famine.
The reports compare the people of Iraq to "the populations in disaster-stricken African
countries." Id. The multilateral ban on Iraqi oil exports has rendered Iraq without the
resources it needs to import food and medicine. Id.
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E. SUMMARY
The two major forms of human rights enforcement, multilateral re-
gimes and unilateral actions, have had both successes and failures.'
Ironically, however, the causes for the failure of one system appear to
be the very reason for the success of the other. Specifically, multilateral
regimes often fail due to the lack of a forceful and effective en-
forcement mechanism. Unilateral actions, such as sanctions, often fail
due to the lack of multilateral support for what often is an effective
enforcement mechanism. When both of these causes are considered, it
becomes clear that a logical remedy would be to combine the strengths
of the two systems while eliminating their weaknesses. Such a combina-
tion would be comprised of a multilateral regime using sanctions to
enforce core human rights and remedy violations of those rights. Thus,
the might of unilateral actions, in the form of trade sanctions by a pow-
erful nation, can be made even mightier by the multilateral support of
other less powerful nations.
II. AN ALTERNATE REGIME
A. INTRODUCTION
The most logical place for a regime using trade sanctions for the
enforcement of human rights is within the provisions of the World
Trade Organization (WTO), ° the largest organization for the regula-
tion of international trade. The new WTO, established in January 1995,
is the most sweeping and ambitious attempt ever undertaken to regulate
international trade activity. The provisions of the VTO, as created by
the Uruguay Round"9 ' of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
229. See supra notes 225-26 and accompanying text (discussing the United States
denial of military aid to Nicaragua in 1977-79 as an example of unilateral action that
was ultimately successful in that it contributed to the eventual overthrow of the
Somoza regime, yet was not entirely successful in that the IMF approved loans to the
Somoza government, thereby thwarting the effect of the United States unilateral sanc-
tions against Nicaragua).
230. Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, opened for sig-
nature Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 13 [hereinafter WTO]. "Multilateral Trade Organiza-
tion" (MTO) was changed to "World Trade Organization" (V TO) in all Uruguay
Round documents. Id.
231. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, opened for signature Dec. 15, 1993, 33 LLM. 9 [hereinafter Uruguay
Round].
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(GATT), 2 will serve to regulate trade and settle disputes on an almost
world-wide scale. 3 The adoption of the WTO by such a large number
of states illustrates that the majority of nations in the world are willing
to allow an international body to liberate, as well as regulate, one of
their major activities, namely trade, in the international sphere.
With such an overwhelming acceptance of an international body for
trade regulation, the possibility arises of expanding that acceptance to
include the enforcement of human rights in conjunction with trade. A
human rights arm of the WTO could be created to make recommenda-
tions for the enforcement of human rights through trade sanctions simi-
lar to existing sanctions for other purposesY 4
In order to make use of the WTO structure in this way, procedures
established for the multilateral enforcement of human rights through
trade sanctions need to be compatible with investigative and dispute
settlement mechanisms already in place within the WTO. The dispute
settlement procedures" within particular agreements instituted by the
Uruguay Round of the GATT could be used as the model, thereby
making use of previously negotiated procedures. For purposes of this
paper, I will make use of the remedies provisions in Article 4 of the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures as a theoretical
modelY6 Article 4 contains a comprehensive regime for the settlement
of disputes regarding prohibited subsidies, as well as for the institution
of panels for investigating and recommending countervailing mea-
sures." 7 As explained below, a modified form of this regime could be
established for the enforcement of human rights.
232. General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. A3, 55 U.N.T.S. 1887 [hereinafter GATT], reprinted in 4 GENERAL
AGREEMENTS ON TARIFFS AND TRADE, BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED Docu-
MENTS [hereinafter BISD].
233. Bhushan Bahree, Italy's Ruggiero is Appointed to Head WTO, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 24, 1995, at All. As of January 1, 1955, more than 80 of the GATT's 128
members have joined in the WTO. More are expected to follow. Id.
234. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Sept. 27, 1994 [herein-
after ASCM] (containing provisions for sanctions in the event of prohibited subsidiar-
ies).
235. Dispute Settlement Procedures, Nov. 30, 1984, reprinted in 31 BISD 9-10
1 (1985).
236. ASCM, supra note 234, art. 4.
237. Id.
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B. COMPATIBILrrY WITH THE GATT
Prior to setting out the precise structure of such a system, it is neces-
sary to consider whether a system for the enforcement of human rights
is even compatible with the GATT, and whether it would fit within the
WTO. At first glance, human rights do not appear to have a place with-
in this trade regime. Upon closer examination, however, human rights
appear to have been a consideration since the very inception of the
concept of an international trade regime.'
In 1944, the Bretton Woods Conference established the charters of the
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development (the World Bank). 9 While the conference did
not specifically address the area of trade, it contemplated the necessity
of an International Trading Organization (ITO).2' The ITO called for
attention to human rights by the inclusion of a provision allowing for
the exclusion of goods made by prison labor.2 ' The Havana Confer-
ence of 1948 produced a completed draft ITO charter.2" However, the
ITO never came into being, primarily due to the United States
Congress' failure to approve it.
243
While the ITO never came into being,2" the GATT subsequently
did.2 4 It was completed at the Geneva Conference in 1947!' While
initially to be subordinated to the ITO, the GATI was brought into
force, and remains in force today, by way of the Protocol of Provisional
Application in 194V2  The Protocol retains the original ITO proposals
238. See infra notes 239-267 and accompanying text (supporting the existence of a
link between international trade and human rights).
239. Bretton Woods Agreement Act, 59 Stat. 512 (1945), as amended (current
version at 22 U.S.C. §§ 286-286gg).
240. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM LAW AND PoucY OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMC REATIONS 31-32 (1989).
241. Department of State Bulletin, Proposed International Trade Organization, Sec-
tion G(6) General Exclusions, Dec. 9, 1945, at 924.
242. Fimal Act and Related Documents, United Nations Conference on Trade and
Employment, Havana, Cuba, Nov. 21, 1947-Mar. 24, 1948. U.N. Doc. IC1TO/1/4
(1948).
243. JACKSON, supra note 240 at 34.
244. Id.
245. GATr, supra note 232, art. XX(e).
246. Geneva Conference, Aug. 12, 1947.
247. JACKSON, supra note 240, at 34-35.
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regarding prison labor.2" Thus, within the original GATT, and all suc-
cessive versions, Article XX (e) provides the following:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be con-
strued to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of
measures:
(e) relating to products of prison labor.
(Emphasis added.)249
The inclusion of this article has apparently never created dissention,
as illustrated by the fact that no member has ever disputed its use."
Moreover, there now appears to be a significant movement toward in-
creasing the GATr's coverage of worldwide labor standards."'
During the Uruguay Round, the United States proposed a formal link
between trade and labor standards in the framework of the WTO.
While it ultimately backed away from this issue, the United States made
it clear that it will continue to pursue such a link,"'3 later asserting
that trade sanctions should be available as a last resort if member na-
tions violated agreed upon standards regarding child and slave laborY4
At the Quadrilateral Meeting following the completion of the Uruguay
Round, representatives of the United States, Europe, Japan and Canada
discussed the subject of a "social clause" in the future rounds." The
social clause would specify labor standards as a precondition for market
access." The European Parliament supports such a social clause."
248. Id.
249. GAT', supra note 232, art. XX(e).
250. JACKSON, supra note 240, at 34.
251. Id.
252. Uruguay Round, supra note 231.
253. U.S. to Press For Trade-Labor Link at WTO, Reuter Newswire, Nov. 16,
1994, available in Westlaw, Int-News database.
254. Robert Evans, U.S. to Pursue Trade-Labor Link in W.T.O., REuTER Bus.
REI., Apr. 4, 1995 (remarks by Deputy Undersecretary of Labor Jack Otero).
255. Quadrilateral Meeting Will Allow EU, USA, Japan and Canada to Discuss
Follow-up to Uruguay Round, Agence Europe, Sept. 9, 1994.
256. Prepared Statement by Jagdish Bhagwati for Bureau of International Labor
Affairs, Fed. News Service, June 28, 1994.
257. Parliament Urges Social Clause Be Included in GAYT Accord, Eurowatch,
Feb. 21, 1994.
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At the time of this writing, the International Labor Organization
(ILO) has not yet decided whether to support the inclusion of a social
clause. 8 The ILO has stated, however, that social considerations
should be applied to the liberalization of trade only if three principles
are followed: first, the framework for such an action must be multilat-
eral; second, any direct link must be restricted to recognition of a limit-
ed group of basic standards concerning workers' rights which consist of
generally accepted human rights; and third, action should be taken to
promote parallelism between social progress and the economic develop-
ment that becomes possible as a result of trade liberalization. 9 The
ILO emphasizes that consensus among members of the WTO can only
be achieved if solutions involve less radical change and are compatible
with existing procedures. 6 The 1LO also stated that a possible loca-
tion for a link between trade and workers' rights could be in Article
XX.
261
As the suggestion of a social clause indicates, a formal link between
trade and human rights is an acceptable idea among industrialized mem-
bers of the WTO. 2 The basis of Article XX(e), as well as increased
regulation of labor standards, is the ability of a member of the WTO to
address the actions of another member's treatment of its citizens or resi-
dents without running afoul of Most Favored Nation obligations.' For
example, Article XX(e) allows member A to bar the goods of member
258. BNA Int'l Bus. & Fin. Daily, Apr. 12, 1995. After a meeting of the Gov-
erning Body in Geneva in April 1995, the ILO announced that it had not yet reached
a decision regarding the social clause, but that a working party would be kept in
session throughout-the remainder of 1995. Id. The meeting did produce a consensus
that the gulf between developed and developing countries regarding a link between
international trade and social standards through a sanctions-based social clause mecha-
nism was so wide that the issue should be temporarily shelved. Id.
259. Background Statement, International Labour Office, Nov. 1994. In the opinion
of ILO Director General Michel Hanseene, the following ILO standards could be
included in a multilateral social clause: freedom of association, the right to organize
and bargain collectively, minimum age for the employment of children and the pro-
gressive abolition of child labor, freedom from discrimination in employment on the
grounds of race, sex, religion or political opinion, and freedom from forced labor. Id.
260. The Social Dimensions of the Liberalization of World Trade 30, Interna-
tional Labor Office, Governing Body, Nov. 1994.
261. Il 33.
262. U.S. to Press for Trade-Labor Link at WTO, supra note 253. There is sig-
nificant resistance to the idea among developing countries which see such a clause as
a form of "back-door protectionism" threatening their comparative advantages on costs.
Id.
263. GATT, supra note 232, art. XX(e).
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B by virtue of member B's use of prison labor to produce those goods
to be exported.' Accordingly, Article XX(e) allows member A to take
action to protect the human rights of member B's citizens and residents
and thus, legally interfere in member B's domestic policy toward its
citizens, without fear of accusations of a denial of the GATT's Most Fa-
vored Nation treatment.25
While some might suggest that this provision is intended merely to
address the unfair competitive advantage a nation making use of prison
labor may have in terms of cost of production, this is not necessarily
the case. The provision is contained within the article addressing envi-
ronmental and public policy concerns, not within any article addressing
unfair competition.' Such a placement can be interpreted as showing
that human rights were a driving force in its inclusion. In addition, as
stated above, no member has ever challenged this provision.
Clearly, Article XX(e) appears to permit one member to use trade
sanctions to protect the human rights of citizens of another member.
Thus, the link between trade and human rights already exists within the
GAT'. Therefore, the inclusion of a human rights body within the WTO
to oversee the enforcement of core human rights would be a logical and
permissible extension of Article XX(e). While Article XX is a shield for
members to avoid violations of Most Favored Nation obligations, it is
also a sword for members to use to address human rights abuses in the
form of prison labor. A human rights body would simply be a multilat-
eral use of the existing shield/sword.
Further, such a system could possibly encounter less resistance than a
social clause addressing labor' standards. As stated above, labor rights
are more political in nature, as they involve the right to act affirmatively
in a certain manner. Being political or collective, labor rights are less
likely to gain universal adherence than the more passive and interna-
tionally espoused core human rights. In addition, the institution of a
social clause addressing labor standards could possibly create more ques-
tions than answers. For example, do the clause's labor standards apply
only to those industries producing products for export, or do they apply
to all laborers within a particular country?
Contrary to the social clause, the application of a human rights sys-
tem for the enforcement of core human rights within the WTO would
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each member state regardless of their employment status. Further, the
system would not be a prerequisite to international trade, but rather a
remedy in the event of violations. As a logical extension of Article
XX(e) in terms of Article XX(e)'s human rights considerations, a system
for the enforcement of core human rights through trade sanctions could
be universally acceptable, provided the rights to be enforced are those
which are espoused by all members. 7
C. THE RIGHTS TO BE ENFORCED
As stated in Part I, in order to gain universal agreement and compli-
ance with such as system, the rights enforced must be those which are
universally espoused. Political and economic rights could not be in-
cluded initially, as such inclusion would negate the possibility of uni-
versal adherence and would also raise the distinct possibility of numer-
ous reservations to the agreement.
The rights enforced should encompass core human rights, essentially
those rights contained within the Second Geneva Protocol and Section
702 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations.' These rights
would include freedom from torture, collective punishments, prolonged
arbitrary detention, genocide, slavery, or threats to commit any of these
acts.' These rights would apply regardless of race, gender or reli-
gion' While the death penalty is considered a form of torture under
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, m freedom from the death penalty could not
be included as a core human right. Due to the widespread approval of
capital punishment, inclusion of the right to be free from the death
penalty would hinder universal acceptance of the agreement.
While this list of rights appears short, it is merely a starting point at
which there could be the greatest chance of acceptance. Such an ap-
proach is consistent with the ILO's expressed desire to limit the labor
standards to be applied in order to gain greater consensus.'m Once
267. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental
human rights generally accepted by all members of the United Nations).
268. See supra notes 54-77 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 71-75 and accompanying text (enumerating basic human
rights).
270. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
271. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
272. Torture Convention, supra note 125.
273. See supra notes 257-60 and accompanying text (emphasizing the need to lim-
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these core human rights are adopted by the WTO as rights to be univer-
sally enforced, it may then be possible to expand the list to include
such rights as freedom from the death penalty and the more political
rights. A provision such as a two-thirds vote of all members in favor of
inclusion of additional human rights would allow for such an expansion.
Initially, however, it would be wisest to begin with a list of only those
core human rights apt to gain immediate acceptance, specifically those
rights already espoused by all member nations.
D. STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURE
As stated above, a human rights arm of the WTO could be created
and called the Human Rights Body (HRB). The HRB would be similar
to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 74 now in place. Like the DSB,
membership in the HRB would be automatic for all current members of
the WTO. This body would include a standing committee, called the
Human Rights Committee, of approximately twelve individuals who
would be representatives of members of the WTO. Each representative
would serve a two-year tenure, with membership revolving among all
WTO members. If possible, various areas of the world would be consis-
tently represented on the committee, i.e., three from Europe, three from
Asia, three from the Americas, three from Africa. There would be no
permanent members as there are in the Security Council of the United
Nations, thereby negating the possibility of any one WTO member ap-
pearing more influential than any other.
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) would be responsible for re-
ceiving reports of denial or abuse of any of the core human rights by
any member of the WTO. Such reports may be received from other
WTO members, individuals or non-governmental organizations. The
HRC would then investigate the matter. If it determines that there is
insufficient evidence of abuse or denial, the HRC may then either dis-
miss the action or request further information from the individual, mem-
ber or organization submitting the report. In doing so, the HRC must
determine the validity of the reports.
Should the HRC find that there is sufficient evidence to warrant
further investigation, it may then order the establishment of an inves-
it protected rights to include only basic labor standards concerning workers' rights, in
order to achieve broad consensus).
274. See Dispute Settlement Procedures, supra note 235 (providing method of dis-
pute settlement).
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tigative panel. No member of this panel may be the same nationality as
that of the member accused or the reporting individual, member or
organization. Membership on the panel should be equally comprised of
trade experts as well as human rights experts. This panel system would
be similar to that contained in Article 4.4 of the Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures." As in Article 4,6 the panel
would review all evidence, as well as permit the accused member the
opportunity to demonstrate that it has not committed any violation. This
last provision, however, should not be interpreted as placing the burden
of proof of innocence on the accused member. Rather, it would provide
the right to due process, i.e., notification and the right to be heard.
Once the panel had fully investigated the report, it must then submit
its conclusions to the HRC. The panel must include its determination as
to the existence of abuse and its recommendation as to action to be
taken by the HRB. Such recommendations may be either (1) dismissal,
due to lack of evidence of a violation, or (2) the institution of sanctions,
based on a violation. As stated above, the inclusion of both human
rights experts as well as trade experts on the panel is essential as such a
decision would entail considerations of both human rights and trade
issues.
As in Article 4,m the HRC would adopt the panel report within
thirty days unless any party involved wishes to appeal. Appeal would be
available to either the accused member in the event of a recommenda-
tion for sanctions, or to the reporting individuals, member or organiza-
tion in the event of a dismissal.
To facilitate appeal, a separate appellate body would be created in
much the same way as in Article 4.27B This appellate body would be
comprised of twelve representatives of all WTO members with a revolv-
ing membership as with the HRC. The members of the appellate body,
however, may not be the same nationality as those of the panel mem-
bers nor the accused member, reporting individual, member or organiza-
tion, thus, providing greater neutrality. As in Article 4,"' the appellate
body must issue its decision within thirty days of the request for appeal.
The HRC must immediately adopt the appellate body's report. Only with
a unanimous vote may the HRC block the appellate body's findings.
275. ASCM, supra note 234, art. 4.4.
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In the event that a report is adopted containing a recommendation for
sanctions, the HRC would then be responsible for notifying all members
of the WTO. Such notification would include a complete report of the
panel's findings, as well as a schedule for the immediate multilateral
institution of sanctions against the member in violation. As human rights
violations and the safety of those whose rights are being violated are
involved, time is of the essence. Ideally, the entire procedure from re-
ceipt of reports to institution of sanctions should take no more than
twelve weeks even with the inclusion of an appeal.
E. TRADE SANCIONS
In order for such a system to be successful, all members must initial-
ly agree upon the trade sanctions to be used. Further, it is essential that
the sanctions are multilaterally applied in order to achieve the greatest
effectiveness.
There are three main types of international sanctions in use today:
those restricting exports to a sanctioned country; those restricting imports
from a sanctioned country; and those that impede finance such as the
reduction of aid, the freezing of assets, and the denial of loans.2"0
Generally, a combination of trade and financial sanctions has been used
most often. For simplicity's sake, however, only one type of sanction
should be adopted for the multilateral enforcement of core human rights.
For a number of reasons, the type of sanction that appears most likely
to be effective and acceptable to all members would be a restriction on
imports from the country found to be violating core human rights.
The reasons why import restrictions would be the most effective type
of .sanction become clear when one considers the most common reasons
for the failure of sanctions. Several commentators have written that trade
sanctions often fail due to a lack of cooperation from other coun-
tries."8 In addition, sanctions often prompt allies of the sanctioned
country to increase their support and thus offset any effects of the sanc-
tions. 2 This was clearly the case most recently in Burma. 83 Finally,
sanctions may alienate allies that do not share the sanctioning country's
280. 1 HUFBAUER, supra note 176, at 36.
281. Id. at 12.
282. Id. at 12.
283. See supra notes 217-219 and accompanying text (describing the United States
aborted attempt to impose trade sanctions against the Burmese government due to the
refusal of other Asian nations to cooperate).
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goals, thereby eliminating any possibility of multilateral support.'z All
of these reasons for failure could be eliminated if the purpose of the
sanctions is one that is supported by all members. Democracy and the
other political rights, as well as Western labor standards, are not accept-
ed by all members of the WTO. Therefore, all members would most
likely not support sanctions for the enforcement of these rights. Sanc-
tions for the enforcement of such rights could more than likely gain
unanimous support among members.
Such universal support would help to ensure the success of sanctions
in the form of restrictions on imports. Import sanctions most often fail
due to the sanctioned country's ability to find alternate markets.' If
all WTO members instituted sanctions restricting imports from the sanc-
tioned member, the only alternate markets remaining to that sanctioned
member would be non-member markets. In light of the number of cur-
rent members, in addition to the number of countries expressing interest
in joining the WTO, those alternate markets should decrease in the
future. In addition, restrictions on imports would, for the most part, have
less of a negative effect on the member countries than on the sanctioned
country. The members would be able to obtain goods from other sources
while the sanctioned member would have few other markets on which to
fall back. Further, a restriction on imports from, rather than exports to,
the sanctioned member would eliminate the need to delineate between
humanitarian and non-humanitarian goods entering the sanctioned mem-
ber state.
The next question is whether the sanctions would apply to all of the
sanctioned country's exports or only to specific goods. It would, of
course, be impossible to restrict the export of only one kind of goods
from all members. Accordingly, two possibilities arise. One possibility
would be a complete restriction on all imports of any kind from the
member in violation; in essence, a complete blockade against any export
activity by that member. The severity of such a sanction, as well as the
staggering logistics of enforcement, make this type of sanction im-
practical. The second alternative would be to restrict the import of the
main product of that country. For example, member A's main product
for export is textiles. Therefore, if member A were found to be violating
core human rights, then all members would institute sanctions restricting
the import of any textiles from member A.
284. 1 HUFBAUER, supra note 176, at 12-13.
285. Id. at 36.
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As was pointed out earlier, the strength of such a system would come
in the form of deterrence. The very existence of a transparent regime of
trade sanctions may effectively deter violations. Further, unlike the social
clause, a system for the enforcement of core human rights would not be
a prerequisite for market access. Rather, it would be a remedy for the
violation of rights espoused by all members. As with sanctions provided
in the GATT for other violations, such as prohibited subsidies, the sanc-
tions would be instituted only in the event of a violation. With regard to
the other GATT sanctions, the transparency of the consequences of a
failure to enforce core human rights could serve as an effective deterrent
to any violations.
In addition, the multilateral and pre-set nature of the sanctions could
help to ensure their success. As one commentator pointed out, the Unit-
ed States was particularly successful in making use of sanctions from
the end of World War II through the early 1970s because of its eco-
nomic leverage. 6 As the economic strength of the United States
waned, sanctioned countries had other choices and used them."8 7 The
institution of multilateral sanctions under the direction of the United Na-
tions against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait, illustrates that sanc-
tions, specifically multilateral sanctions, can be very effective when
actively enforced and backed by economic leverage."' Other commen-
tators have pointed out that experience has shown that a "hard and fast"
application of sanctions maximizes the impact as it gives the sanctioned
country less time to prepare and thus, divert the sanctions' effects.289
Finally, sanctions are most successful when the sanctioning country
avoids high costs to itself." Pre-set multilateral sanctions within the
WTO could attain the same sort of success as those employed against
Iraq, as they too would be applied quickly and effectively giving the
sanctioned member little time to seek immediate alternate markets.
While there would be no way to eliminate completely the cost of such
sanctions to the sanctioning countries, mechanisms for alternate supplies
of the sanctioned member's products could be created.
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As to the duration of the sanctions once instituted, the HRC would be
charged with oversight of compliance. The sanctioned member would be
responsible for providing clear proof of cessation of its violations as
well as steps taken to prevent further violations. Only after the HRC is
satisfied that the sanctioned member has made sufficient progress would
the sanctions be lifted.
CONCLUSION
In the past ten years, human rights tragedies have abounded. To com-
prehend the seriousness of the situation and the urgent need for some
type of effective enforcement of core human rights, one need only con-
sider such tragedies as the tribal slaughters in Rwanda, the atrocities in
the former Yugoslavia and the thousands of demonstrators gunned down
by government forces in Burma. The alarming frequency of horrific
violations of fundamental human rights illustrates the overall ineffective-
ness of current methods of protection. An effective alternative is obvi-
ously needed, one that is capable of garnering universal support and
which has quick and effective mechanisms for enforcement. Limiting the
rights to be protected to those which are apolitical, and therefore com-
patible with all ideologies, could ensure universal support of such a
system. Basing the sanctions for violations on international trade, an
economic activity practiced by virtually all nations, will allow swift,
effective enforcement within an already existing trade regime, the WVTO.
The result of ever-increasing international trade is that nations are no
longer independent of each other economically."' Therefore, the denial
of a nation's ability to trade internationally can have a devastating effect
on its economy.' However, sanctions against a nation whose trade
practices injure the economy of another nation appear to have greater
support than do sanctions for other misdeeds such as violations of hu-
man rights.
In light of the overwhelming support of sanctions to remedy viola-
tions of internationally accepted trade practices, it is logical to make use
of an existing trade regime such as the WVTO to enforce another equally
pressing problem, violations of basic human rights by member states.
When a member state faces the possibility of loss of access to interna-
291. See supra notes 227-228 and accompanying text (describing the situation in
Iraq after the 1990 U.N.-imposed multilateral economic sanctions).
292. See supra notes 227-28 and accompanying text.
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tional markets if it violates the human rights of its residents and citi-
zens, it may think twice about committing such violations.
